Hazardous Substance Proposal
(August 1999)
A recent article mentioned the USCG's March 22, 1999,
Notice of Proposed RuleMaking (NPRM) concerning Tank Vessel Response Plans for
Hazardous Substances. Since that time, I've spent a good deal of time
thinking about this NPRM. I feel it appropriate to address some
additional aspects of the proposal.
There are many issues seemingly unresolved within the
proposal. Is it the USCG's intent to establish a new industry for
hazardous substance response recovery, developing techniques and recovery
equipment not widely in use?
If one takes seriously what the USCG has written, such
would seem to be the case. It would seem the USCG is taking the
experience gained from many years of working with oil recovery and attempting
to apply it to chemical responses. Is that possible? Many think it
isn't.
The issues with chemicals are far more complicated
and at times very dangerous. The Comprehensive Environmental Response
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) has been around for about 20 years.
The strategies needed to clean up chemical releases under this Act are
sometimes fairly straightforward and simple. At other times, the
remediation is extremely complex and involves very sophisticated engineering
solutions sometimes only relevant to the one specific spill site. Such
responses do not equate to oil spill clean-up mentality.
I have often heard it said jokingly the USCG's position
toward pollution response is one of rigid flexibility. Rigid in whatever
they wish to stand firm on and flexible about issues not important to them.
The hard thing to determine is which issues they intend to stand firm on and
which ones will allow flexibility. Their perceived view toward personnel
safety will probably drive many of their actions; however, there will be no
clear consistency.
We envision the possibility the USCG will establish such a
conservative response doctrine that everyone will be safe because everyone
within the hot zone will always be protected by breathing apparatus and
encapsulated suits. Rumors persist about the USCG requiring entry
personnel to don SCBA's with "Level A" (breathing apparatus & encapsulated
suits) entry equipment, while personnel from other USCG commands are inside
the hot zone without designated equipment.
How can this be? It probably means the entry doctrine
was too conservative and some of the Coasties knew it and would not allow the
inappropriate doctrine and equipment to get in their way. I don't think
the USCG knows as much about chemical transport as it thinks. There are
experts in chemical engineering at various levels within the USCG, but rarely
is there a consistent body of knowledge concerning chemical response at the
field level. Changes in personnel still occur too rapidly to adequately
develop and maintain the needed expertise. Chemical responses are highly
complex and dangerous. Often, there is no viable doctrine for short-term
removal. It ain't oil.
The best doctrine for removal is to isolate the spill as
much as possible and let nature take its course. Nature can be augmented
with engineering solutions. Short-term recovery normally just doesn't
work. Maybe the best focus of the spill should be on the salvage of the
vessel, containment of the cargo and the elimination of further potential for
spill.
There is no question many chemical and oil spills have been
seriously exacerbated by not giving salvage the highest priority. An
example might be the grounding of M/V New Carissa off Coos Bay, OR where
the emphasis was on destroying the bunker tank tops and burning the oil.
Would things have worked better if more emphasis had been placed on salvage
and less toward destroying the fuel carried on board?
Many persons consider the New Carissa incident to be a
showcase of how government should respond to spill incidents. There are
many of us who disagree with that judgment. Material compatibility
issues during a chemical response effort are issues of major concern.
There is a great deal of difference between mucking oil and recovering spilled
sulfuric acid or for that matter, many of the chemicals included.
As an example, let us address ethylene dichloride (EDC).
Direct contact with liquid or vapors presents a serious health hazard.
EDC is a suspected carcinogen. With a specific gravity of 1.26, it is
clearly a sinker. Not soluble in water, it might be concluded, with
added protection for personnel, it can be cleaned up in a manner similar to
asphalt. The problem is, EDC is also solvent to many industrial
materials used to make the equipment that might be used to clean it up.
EDC is carried in stainless steel tanks because it tends to dissolve
everything else.
Does this mean we have to manufacture all equipment used to
clean up an EDC spill out of stainless steel and have the equipment available
to every navigating vessel all the time?
It should also be remembered there have been very few - if
any - successful recoveries of submerged asphalt, let alone recovery of a
highly solvent material. Is it theoretically possible? Yes. Has it
ever been done? Probably. Does it use a technology or methodology that
can be widely duplicated? Doubtful. Does all this knowledge concerning
how to do this reside with the transporter? No.
This is only one example of an extremely complex set of
variables. Every chemical has its own characteristics and associated
problems. The clean-up strategies and efforts will generally have to be
designed based upon the specific waters and conditions of the incident.
It is curious these rules are applicable only to the
transporters of chemicals. Proposed rules for facilities are yet to be
forthcoming. It would seem high levels of expertise are required to
resolve issues raised in the proposal. Chemical transporters are very
knowledgeable about their trade, but it would seem manufacturers should have
more expertise concerning spill incidents than transporters.
Professional transporters only carry product because someone else manufactured
the product and some third party wants to use it.
Shouldn't those parties manufacturing and storing chemicals
be the ones to provide the resolutions of contentious issues concerning spill
clean-up and remediation.
