The Threat Is Real
Port Security Dominates USCG Agenda
(January 2002)
One can only be troubled by the fact that there was at
least one confirmed American fighting for the Al Qaeda. This young American,
John Walker, was attending an Islamic school in or near Saudi Arabia when he
became embroiled in the Al Qaeda (probably with his classmates). This means
the extremist Islamic teachings that build terrorist mentality are not just in
the Madrasus of poor Pakistan but are located in middle and upper class
locales of Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in the Islamic world. The arrest in
October of Armed Farid Rizk in a well appointed intermodal container bound for
Canada must give one pause. The container was equipped with satellite phone,
laptop computer and all the comforts of home. He had credentials giving access
to airports in Canada, Egypt and Thailand. The stowaway must have had
significant support in the port at which the container was loaded and expected
support in the port of discharge. The stowaway was only detected in a third
port. What other surprises can we expect to find in the thousands of
containers which move on a daily basis?
It is very disquieting that depleted uranium has been found
in an underground bunker in Afghanistan. Was this intended for use in
Afghanistan or for exportation to some other country such as the U.S. for use
as part of a "dirty bomb"? How will all of this effect international maritime
trade? Part of the problem is that it is very difficult to fully define the
threats to which our ports are being subjected. Are we concerned about
protecting vessels that use our ports and waterways? Must we only be concerned
about protecting our port facilities, be they passenger terminals, bulk liquid
terminals, or container facilities? Or are we concerned about individuals that
may be terrorists and/or items that may be smuggled into the U.S. for use by
terrorists. Certainly, the latter is the government's position in New York
harbor, but not everywhere in the U.S. This is going to be a long conflict.
Maritime operators and others must be prepared to weather it.
The Coast Guard's Response It is expected that the USCG
Port Security measures for U.S. ports and waterways will remain the major
concern of the USCG, eclipsing all other issues for the coming months, if not
the foreseeable future. Port security will continue to be the dominant issue
for the U.S. Coast Guard, as long as terrorism remains a major concern to the
U.S. general public and the military. Clearly, immediate emergency increased
funding and increased budget funding will probably be forthcoming from the
Congress. There is no question that USCG current annual funding is inadequate
to the task. The USCG is attempting to increase security across the board and
protect all re than normal. Vessel owners and operators in concert with
various overseas security agencies are probably in the best position to limit
possible terrorist use of their vessels. Watching the airline industry, we see
delay of passenger access to aircraft being a major tool used to gain
compliance with security requirements. This includes the clearing of
concourses and even whole terminals if something suspicious is detected.
Similar action can be expected in the maritime. We fully expect that vessels'
clearances and movements in port areas will have the potential for at least
similar delays for security considerations. A vessel that follows all
government security procedures can expect delays but will be allowed to ply
its trade. Non-conformance with government dictates will no doubt lead to much
more extensive delays. If real problems are detected, delays will probably be
monumental.
